Why did Putin invade Ukraine now? A hypothesis…
Note to readers: This is a discussion of geopolitical strategy surrounding tragic events that are presently unfolding in Ukraine. I condemn all war, without exception. Nothing in this story should be construed as justification for Putin’s invasion, it is simply an attempt to try and understand one of the most puzzling aspects: why now?
Background
When Vladimir Putin ordered his army into Ukraine in late February, it surprised many of us. Yes, US intelligence was making a lot of noise about it in the weeks prior, but not many of us took it seriously. Of course we have become accustomed to taking everything US intelligence says with a grain of salt over the years, but even President Zelensky was going out and trying to calm his public and rebuking the US for stoking hysteria in the days prior. There was a lot that didn’t make sense, including the motive for Putin to invade now.
Unlike many others, I was never convinced that Putin was acting irrationally. There had to be a reason, but I couldn’t see it. In my view, time was on Putin’s side, and there was no reason for him to invade Ukraine now when waiting seemed to offer more favorable conditions. The unilateral sanctions imposed by the Trump administration on the new Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline from Russia to western Europe had already begun to drive a wedge between some NATO members and the US. Outgoing German Chancellor Angela Merkel was famously critical of US attempts to block the pipeline deal. The NATO alliance has been through a number of tests over the years, such as when President G.W. Bush pressured reluctant NATO members in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. But this gas deal seemed to be a new turning point, and an issue that was sure to hit Germans in their pocketbooks.
Additionally, the US has not been doing so well at projecting power in this century, and any casual observer could be forgiven for perceiving that it is looking more like an empire in decline after debacles in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Libya, and more, along with an increasingly unstable domestic political situation and volatile financial markets requiring constant bailouts from the central bank. There are some who might shrug these matters off as inconsequential, but there are many who take away a coherent message that things are not going so well for the US.
So my initial puzzlement surrounded a simple question: why would Putin choose February 2022 to invade Ukraine, when the smart move seemed to be waiting for the NATO alliance and the US empire to fall into a worse condition? I have been racking my brain trying to understand in the weeks since…after much trial and error and discussion, I have come up with a hypothesis that may help to explain the timing chosen by Putin.
Key Point 1: China
China. The “800 pound gorilla” that was always present in the room, but we often fail to integrate the rising dragon into our views in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. It is easy to fall into a trap of having a western-centric view of these situations.
If the US can be said to be an empire in decline, there is no question that China has has been in ascendancy in recent decades. Many observers expect China to achieve parity with the US, and perhaps continue to become a unipolar hegemon this century. I don’t need to go into details, this is already widely discussed and familiar to anyone reading this piece.
Here’s the thing: Russia is an enormous resource-rich nation, while China is a ravenously resource-hungry industrial powerhouse. China critically needs Russia’s resources, and Russia needs China as a steady customer who pays fair prices. So, as China becomes more powerful why wouldn’t they simply invade Siberia and take over its vast resources for themselves? Or force Russia to become a client state that is bound to obey China as the Asia hegemon? Surely China is growing very powerful and its military might even be able to pull off such a feat. This is a question that has been haunting Russians since Mao’s revolution, and must be on Putin’s mind in recent years.
So the question for Putin is: how does Russia avoid becoming either a vassal to, or over-taken by, China? The answer is that Russia needs to be able to project as much power as possible, and strike a long-term arrangement now. After all the rhetoric and propaganda is cleared away, international relations ultimately boils down to which side would prevail in a (usually hypothetical) contest between military powers.
Lesson 2: To project power east, shore up the weak flanks
The best chance Russia has to strike a long-term relationship with China is to show military strength, and to shore up its weak flanks in the south and west. To this end, Russia helped put down a US-led coup attempt against the Assad regime in Syria, an apparent coup attempt in Kazakhstan earlier this year, but still faces hangovers from similar “color revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine.
After the Maidan revolt in Ukraine in 2014, Russia seized the Crimean peninsula and a civil war broke out between Ukrainian ultra-nationalists and the dominantly Russian population in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas). The conflict became international news when a Malaysian Airlines flight was shot down over East Ukraine. Over the years, the US has been sending military aid to far-right militant groups in Ukraine in order to stoke the conflict, and a proxy war developed between the US and Russia that has grown increasingly troublesome.
If Putin wants to shore up flanks and show strength toward China sooner than later (before China grows more powerful), taking care of this festering problem in Ukraine is essential.
Lesson 3: NATO is helpful for Putin because it restrains the west
There is so much discussion about NATO expansion being the reason for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. But many have noted that there are holes in this narrative, such as the fact that NATO leaders have long been saying that Ukraine is not welcome in the alliance. Furthermore, other countries that are right on Russia’s border, such as Estonia (less than 100 km from St. Petersburg), have long been NATO members. So the idea that having NATO members right along Russia’s border presents an unacceptable security risk to Russia doesn’t seem to add up.
However, when I watched events unfold in the Ukraine invasion, it started to become clear to me that NATO was actually helpful to Putin. The event that changed my views was the attempt by NATO member Poland to transfer fighter jets to Ukraine, which was blocked by other NATO leaders because it was deemed too risky as a provocation that could lead to WW3. The problem was that, if Russia were to retaliate against Poland using military force, then all NATO countries would be obligated to go to war with Russia. World leaders are sympathetic to the plight of Ukrainians, however, they do not wish to start a world war over Ukraine.
This kind of collectivity is a key element of NATO in post-WW2 Europe, and generally helps to prevent conflicts from breaking out in the NATO domain. It imposes a constraint on the ability for individual NATO members to use military force as they might wish, and without the blessing of the alliance’s most powerful members. But it is very helpful to Putin, because he knows that Poland cannot do much owing to these restraints. Imagine a similar situation played out after NATO had already been shuttered…Poland and other nations bordering Ukraine would be free to engage militarily as they please, which would present a nightmare having many unmanageable degrees of freedom for Putin.
If NATO is in decline, and its internal system of restraints is helpful to Putin, then it is another reason for him to invade Ukraine now while NATO is still strong enough to reign in individual members like Poland.
Summary
I hope that I have laid out these arguments clearly enough for you to understand the hypothesis regarding why Putin may have chosen this moment to invade Ukraine. In a nutshell, there are 3 key points here:
(1) Russia needs to establish a long-term relationship with China to trade Russian resources before China grows too powerful and can take them by force.
(2) To project more strength toward China now, Putin needs to take care of the festering problems on Russia’s other borders.
(3) Putin needs to take advantage of the constraints on western nations’ responses imposed by the NATO alliance before the bloc weakens further and is unable to enforce discipline between member states.
I don’t know if this is the real reason why Putin chose this moment in time to invade, but for the moment it is the best explanation I can come up with. If you have other thoughts or ideas on this matter, please share in the comments.
